By Ifay Chang, Commentator, U.S.-China Forum
The Deadlock
Sino–U.S. relations have now reached a new low and entered a deadlock. Since World War II, relations have undergone many changes. During the war, the two countries were allies resisting Japanese militarism. China, under the leadership of the Nationalist Party, fought against Japan, but internally was divided by warlords and faced the rise of the Chinese Communist Party. Following the victory in World War II, the rivalry between the two parties led to civil war. The result was that the Communist Party took control of mainland China, while the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan.
During the war, the United States supported the Nationalist government. The postwar international situation quickly formed into a two–power contest: the communist Soviet Union and its allies on one side, and the United States and its allies on the other, leading to the Cold War. A divided China fit into this structure, with the Soviets backing mainland China and the United States backing Taiwan. Korea was likewise divided into North and South, each controlled respectively by the Soviets and the U.S., leading to fierce confrontation and eventually the Korean War.
The Soviet Union, in the name of alliance, wanted to send troops through China and demanded Chinese participation. China, wary of Russia for having seized vast Chinese territories in the past, decided independently to enter the war to aid North Korea against South Korea and U.S. forces to avoid Russian troops from entering China. For three years, China fought the U.S. military to a standstill at the 38th parallel, forcing the U.S. and South Korea into an armistice. Despite heavy sacrifices, China made its name by defeating a far stronger adversary with weaker arms.
Meanwhile, Taiwan benefited as a supplier to the U.S Korean War and developed rapidly thanks to U.S. support, laying the foundation for becoming one of the “Four Asian Tigers.” Initially, Taiwan still dreamed of counterattacking the mainland to reunify China, but after the Korean War, the U.S. opposed such plans. Instead, Washington sought to maintain the status quo, contain the mainland, and cultivate Taiwan as a prosperous, democratic economy that could achieve de facto independence without war.
On the mainland, the goal remained national unification, but with the country devastated by war, the government had to focus on rebuilding and finding a path to rapid development. After many setbacks, it was only after the end of the Cold War that China found a more systematic road to economic growth. Later, as international turmoil arose in the Middle East and terrorism surged, the U.S. homeland was attacked in 2001. Washington shifted its strategic and diplomatic focus, temporarily overlooking China’s rise. In that period, China’s GDP grew at double-digit rates.
In 2001, China joined the WTO, and by 2010, it had become the world’s second-largest economy. The U.S. strategic pivot soon followed, defining China as its primary competitor and launching full-scale suppression in trade, technology, and geopolitics. U.S.–China relations plunged: America branded China an enemy, rallied allies to contain it diplomatically, imposed economic sanctions, cut off technology exchanges, and sought to use Taiwan to provoke a prolonged proxy conflict across the Taiwan Strait to wear China down militarily.
For years, China had kept a low profile, “hiding capabilities and biding time,” maintaining a moderate stance toward the U.S. while preparing for confrontation with American hegemony. Especially in the military sphere, China steadily modernized its armed forces. At this year’s September 3rd military parade commemorating the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, China confidently declared to the world its ability to defend its sovereignty and uphold world justice. The U.S. has launched a global tariff war, but only with China has it hit a hard obstacle, resulting in today’s diplomatic and economic stalemate.
The Source of the Stalemate
The stalemate arises from the gap between U.S. and Chinese policies and the U.S. not accepting realities. China’s policies have never been clearly explained with deep thoughts to avoid being interpreted as countering U.S. hegemonic “America First” thinking. China possesses a philosophy of wangdao (rule by moral principle, not domination), yet has not effectively communicated it with convincing stories.
Can the deadlock be broken? The author believes it is possible but difficult. China can adjust policies, though implementation takes time. The U.S., with internal political turmoil and bipartisan infighting, has tied anti-China measures into its partisan struggle, creating a knot hard to untangle. The greatest uncertainty lies in America’s political unpredictability. Still, if China quickly puts forward policies to resolve the deadlock and pursues them wholeheartedly, the U.S.—facing its own internal problems—may be forced to reflect and could awaken to a new approach.
At present, the initiative lies mostly with China. Right now, China stands in a somewhat stronger position, with the September 3rd parade boosting its confidence further. China never wanted a deadlock; it shifted from softness to firmness only because Trump’s hegemonic “America First” was pushed too aggressively. But China had long prepared countermeasures, so while many countries bowed to U.S. trade and tariff pressure, China resisted and even gained the upper hand. China’s comprehensive industrial system, along with diversified imports and stockpiles of energy and agricultural products, provides insurance against crises.
Thus, the author believes it is possible for China to resolve the deadlock. If China adopts the following policies with full effort, the U.S. might rethink, realize that China is not its enemy, and move toward a resolution.
Possible Solution to Break the Deadlock
The policies are not complicated, but must be carried out wholeheartedly. China needs to compete for its own voice in global discourse, which is currently dominated by U.S.-controlled media. Drawing on its success in hosting international forums, China should convene global conferences to explain its development path as rooted in traditional Chinese wangdao philosophy.
This requires a detailed explanation of wangdao: ruling without domination, striving for peace and shared prosperity. Historical examples should be cited. In modern times, China has explored ways to improve the livelihood of its huge population with some success, and under the wangdao principles, it wishes to share prosperity with the world. The Belt and Road Initiative is such an example.
Yet Chinese citizens themselves often lack a deep understanding of wangdao; how then can the West be expected to grasp it? Wangdao arises from China’s long history of ruling a vast land with 56 ethnic groups and 21 neighboring countries, each with different cultures, religions, and languages—conditions bound to produce friction. Over thousands of years, various governing philosophies merged into wangdao, allowing China to unify into a great power without turning hegemonic.
This is beyond Western understanding. Europe, with a geography similar in size to China, is divided by languages, religions, and ethnic lines, and has been unable to unify peacefully, leading to frequent wars and even two world wars. Even today, Europe seeks unity but fails—the EU is living proof.
The United States, by contrast, was founded late, with few neighbors, functioning almost like an island nation. Its early settlers were mostly Christian Europeans who nearly wiped out the indigenous peoples, creating a unified North America unlike Europe’s historical experience. Benefiting from being offshore, the U.S. profited greatly from World War I and II and emerged as the world’s top power, turning to hegemonism. But America’s vast land with sparse population required immigration, which brought in global talent. It’s a free and democratic system built on a kind of “world paradise,” but at the same time, it imposed its political system on other countries by force, through military interventions and covert operations—a clear hegemonic practice.
Now, however, U.S. domestic politics is plagued by contradictions: partisan deadlock, declining governmental efficiency, rising national debt, and racial tensions between old and new immigrants. Abroad, more rising powers refuse to submit. Faced with China’s rise under wangdao, the U.S. finds that its hegemonic tools cannot suppress it, thus producing the current deadlock.
Conferences alone are insufficient. China must heavily invest in the Belt and Road Initiative, Confucius Institutes, and global educational exchanges and the like to accelerate the interpretation and promotion of wangdao thought.
Conclusion
Such policies would surely influence the United States, because its internal and external crises require reflection and solutions. Exposure to real examples of wangdao in Chinese practice, compared with China’s actual situation, could make it possible to resolve the Sino–U.S. stalemate. Turning confrontation into partnership remains a very real possibility.